In this paper we describe the design of an Integrated Health Monitoring and Fast on-Line Actuator Reconfiguration Enhancement (IHM-FLARE) system whose role is to combine the failure parameter estimates from the two systems while assuring robustness to false failure alarms, missed detections, and failure detection delays. The main feature of the IHM-FLARE is that, besides assuring robustness, it can also improve the performance of the closed-loop system as more accurate failure information becomes available. The integration of the failure parameter estimates generated by both systems is carried out, and the worst-case performance bound is calculated for the case when the Health Monitoring system generates false failure information (i.e. either missed detections or false alarms) for all time. Properties of the proposed system are evaluated through simulations of a high-performance aircraft under multiple simultaneous flight-critical failures.
I. Introduction
I N the last several years, there has been substantial progress in the design and implementation of on-line Failure Detection, Identification and Reconfiguration (FDIR) algorithms in flight control.
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The main feature of these systems is their capability to rapidly detect flight-critical failures and reconfigure the control laws to assure the stability of the resulting closed-loop system. Most of the approaches are based on indirect adaptive control techniques and architectures that include local on-line FDI subsystems. However, in this context failure isolation is of a secondary concern since, even with inaccurate estimates of the failure-related parameters, it may still be possible to demonstrate the stability of the closed-loop system. On the other hand, Health Monitoring Systems (HMS) monitor a large number of both critical and non-critical components, and their role is to detect and isolate the faults and failures, or predict that a failure may occur, and alert the crew in a timely manner.
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Since such systems are commonly designed separately from the flight control algorithms, the HMS information is either not used to automatically reconfigure the controller, or is used only for accommodation of a limited class of single failures. The main reason for this is the fact that HM systems are prone to false alarms, missed detections, and detection delays, and the use of such information in the feedback control law may lead to substantial performance deterioration and instability of the system. On the other hand, after the transients due to the false alarms or missed detections, the HMS can eventually yield the accurate failure information. A challenge that arises in this context is how to take advantage of the HMS-generated information in the reconfigurable control law and assure the stability, robustness and performance of the closed-loop system in the presence of severe flight-critical failures. Since an increasing use of complex HMS is expected in both commercial and military aviation, techniques that effectively combine the HMS with reconfigurable controllers to accommodate a large class of failures while achieving robustness to false failure information are of great interest in practice.
The problem of combining the HMS with reconfigurable control under false failure information has been studied in. 13, 14 In, 13 the author presents a technique, based on the approach to LPV systems with brief instabilities reported in, 15 for fault tolerant control design under false alarms or missed detections. The basic assumption is that the failure parameters are generated by a separate FDI system, and that the parameter estimates cannot stay at the wrong values longer than a prespecified amount of time T pi . Based on this assumption, the fault-tolerant control design problem is formulated as an LMI optimization problem to minimize the upper bound on a measure of the worst-case performance degradation due to the false alarms or missed detections. As a result, a controller is designed that is robust to all Figure 1 .
Structure of the proposed Integrated Health Monitoring and FLARE (IHM-FLARE) System
variations of the failure parameters under the assumption of known T pi . The approach results in a controller that is less conservative than that designed to be robust to all possible failure parameter variations. The main disadvantages of the approach from 13 are as follows:
• The largest time interval during which the false alarm or a missed detection is allowed needs to be known. In general, this information is unknown since false alarms are mainly due to the effect of uncertainty or disturbances that act on the aircraft over unknown intervals of time.
• Since the resulting controller is robust to variations of the failure parameters, even when the parameter estimates are known accurately, there is no mechanism to incorporate this information in the control law and hence improve the performance of the closed-loop system.
• It is not clear as to how to extend the proposed approach to the case of nonlinear aircraft dynamics.
In this paper we describe an innovative approach to combining the HMS with reconfigurable control to accommodate a large class of flight-critical failures. The approach will have the following advantages:
• The time interval over which the controller has wrong information about the failure need not be known.
• If the Health Monitoring System (HMS) eventually generates an accurate estimate of the failure parameters (possibly after an arbitrary number of missed detections and false alarms), the proposed approach will result in increased robustness of the closed-loop system and its improved performance.
• The proposed approach can be readily extended to the case of nonlinear aircraft dynamics.
• The proposed IHM-FLARE system can be implemented in a retrofit fashion which enables the baseline controller to be retained, and facilitates the Verification & Validation procedure.
The proposed IHM-FLARE system is shown in Figure 1 . It consists of the FLARE (Fast on-Line Actuator Reconfiguration Enhancement) subsystem, described below, the signal conversion module (SCM), and the information fusion module (IFM). The SCM converts the failure related signals generated by the HM system into a form acceptable by the FLARE system. The role of the IFM is to fuse the information from FLARE and SCM to arrive at a combined estimate of failure related parameters. The IFM will be designed in such a way that the use of this information in the Adaptive Reconfigurable Control (ARC) law will assure the robustness of the system in the presence of false failure alarms or missed detections.
FLARE System
...
Figure 2. Structure of the FLARE (Fast on-Line Actuator Reconfiguration Enhancement) System
The FLARE system, shown in Figure 2 , consists of a local Failure Detection and Identification (FDI) subsystem that generates the estimates of failure-related parameters, and is designed in concert with the adaptive reconfigurable control (ARC) subsystem that is implemented in a retrofit fashion. The main feature of the FLARE system is that it effectively accommodates multiple simultaneous control actuator failures and control effector damage while achieving the performance at or close to the desired one.
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The coordination between the FDI and reconfigurable control is through failure detection rather than failure identification, and the closed-loop system can be shown to be robust even when the FDI system does not generate accurate estimates of the failure-related parameters. This is due to the fact that the FLARE system is designed within the framework of indirect adaptive control which is known to assure the stability of the closed-loop system even when the unknown parameters are not accurately identified. While the FLARE system is stabilizing even under multiple failures, the performance may suffer when the failure-related parameters are not accurately identified.
On the other hand, the HMS performs a number of additional tests and may eventually generate the accurate failure estimates (e.g. through self diagnostics). However, in the transient, it may generate false alarms or result in missed detections. Using such false information in the reconfigurable control law can quickly destabilize the system. For this reason we propose an approach for fusing the HM information with that from FLARE within the architecture shown in Figure 1 .
The main objective of this work is to arrive at an information fusion algorithm that assures robustness of the overall closed-loop system to false alarms, missed detections and failure detection delays, and achieves the desired closed-loop performance. The approach developed in this context is described in the following sections.
II. Problem Statement
In this paper our focus is on nonlinear aircraft models with state variables accessible. The model is of the form: are assumed to be sufficiently smooth, and λ 1i >> λ 2i and λ 1i >> 1. It is interesting to note that, in many cases, the dynamics of the flight control actuators is accurately described by the above model where
, ω ni denotes the natural frequency, and ω ni ≥ 30, so that λ 1i /λ 2i ≥ 20. Hence, in practice, the above assumptions related to the relative sizes of λ 1i and λ 2i are justified in most of the cases.
The above model corresponds to the case when the components of the vector x 1 are Euler angles, while their derivatives, rather than the angular rates, are a part of vector x 2 . Remaining components of x 2 are the angle-of-attack, side-slip angle and total velocity. The transformation from the standard aircraft model to the above form is given previously. T is nonsingular for all x on a domain containing x = 0. Reference Model: The reference model is chosen in the form:
where x * is the state of the reference model, the reference model is asymptotically stable, and r is a vector of bounded piece-wise continuous reference inputs (commands). Control Objective: The objective is to design a control law u c (t) such that the error x(t) − x * (t) tends to zero asymptotically even in the presence of different flight control actuator failures. Baseline Control Strategy: To achieve the control objective in the ideal case (i.e. the case without control actuator failures), the following baseline control law is chosen:
where
To demonstrate that the control law (7) achieves the control objective in an approximate sense, the expressions (3) and (4) are rewritten as:ü
from which one arrives at:
Since λ 1i >> 1 and λ 1i >> λ 2i , it follows that 1/λ 1i ∼ = 0 and λ 2i /λ 1i ∼ = 0. Hence, using the singular perturbation arguments, it can be concluded that the approximate lower order dynamics of the plant with the actuators is of the form:
Upon substituting the control law (7) into the above equation, one obtainsẍ 1 = A m x+B m r. Hence the reduced-order dynamics of the closed-loop system coincides with that of the reference model (modulo initial conditions), and the tracking error e c (t) = x(t) − x m (t) tends to zero asymptotically, i.e. the baseline controller achieves the objective in an approximate sense. This conclusion is important for studying the case with actuator failures, as discussed in the following section.
III. Failure Detection and Identification (FDI) and Fault-Tolerant Control (FTC) Design
The problem addressed in this paper is that of failure accommodation in a system characterized by second-order actuator dynamics with non-measurable rates, implementing the case of the failure parameterization, proposed in.
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III.A. Failure Modeling
In previous work, actuator failure models were derived for the case of σ − k parameterization, 17 where the failures are modeled in terms of two uncertain failure-related parameters. In this paper, we develop the FDI algorithms using θ parameterization 16 for the case of second-order actuator dynamics with non-measurable rates. The advantage of θ-parameterization is that a large class of failures is described using a single parameter.
The mathematical models of actuator dynamics in the nominal (no failure) case will be considered first, followed by the case of total and partial loss of effectiveness. Nominal Model: In this case the actuator dynamics is described by a stable second-order model of the form:
where λ 1i >> 1, λ 2i >> 1, and λ 1i >> λ 2i .
Failure Model: The model based on the θ parameterization is chosen in the form:
where δ << 1, and
in-place and hard-over)
, where δ i << i andk i < 1 denotes the value of the actuator gain after the failure. It is seen that, when θ i = 0, u 2i (t) tends to zero exponentially with the rate of convergence dominated by λ 2i . Since λ 2i >> 1, arbitrarily fast convergence can be obtained to emulate the situation in the case of total LOE failures when, at the time instant of the failure, all derivatives are instantaneously set to zero. It is also seen that for θ i = 1, we have δ/(θ i + δ) ∼ = 0, and the above model (10)-(11) reduces to the nominal form (8)-(9).
III.B. On-Line FDIR
This section focuses on local FDI algorithms designed for the θ parameterization approach.
16
The case of second-order actuator dynamics with non-measurable rates for σ − k failure parameterization was studied previously. 18 First note that in the actuator failure model of the form (10)-(11), only u 1i is measurable. Therefore, in order to arrive at stable adjustment laws for the estimates of θ i , the following filtered variables are introduced:
Returning to (11) and by moving the term −λ 2i u 2i to the left hand side, taking the Laplace transform, and solving for u 2i , one obtains:
modulo exponentially decaying initial conditions.
Observer: Using (12), the observer for θ i is now chosen as:
where signals ξ i are to be designed to assure the stability of the overall system. Error Model: Letê i =û 1i − u 1i and φ i =θ i − θ i . Upon subtracting the model (12) from the observer (13) one obtains:ė
Next, an assumption is made regarding the values of τ i . Assumption 2: τ i are chosen as τ i = λ 1i /λ 2i .
Hence, using the singular perturbation arguments, it follows that:
Theorem III.1:
The following adaptive laws and the adjustment laws for
where γ i > 0 and
Proof: First derivative of (15) is taken first, and a term λ 2iêi is added to the both sides, resulting in:
Upon substituting (17) and neglecting the term δu 1i φ 2 i /(θ i + δ) 2 /(θ i + δ), one obtains:
Let a tentative Lyapunov function be of the form:
The following property of the adaptive algorithms with projection is used next (see e.g.
5
): if the adaptive law is of the
With these facts, the first derivative of V along the solutions of the system is:
Hence eachê i is bounded (each φ i is bounded due to the use of the projection algorithm). Upon integratingV from 0 to ∞, one obtains:
Since the term on the left hand side is bounded, it follows
III.C. Adaptive Reconfigurable Controller
The design of the reconfigurable controller that effectively compensates for the effect of a class of possible failures is based on a reduced-order model of the system consisting of the dynamics of the plant and the actuator dynamics. The equations (8), (9) are first rewritten asü 1i + λ 2iu1i + λ 1i u 1i = λ 1i (θ i u ci + δu1i θi+δ ), and the latter equation is divided by λ 1i to obtain:
Since λ 1i >> 1 and λ 1i >> λ 2i , and 1/λ 1i ∼ = 0 and λ 2i /λ 1i ∼ = 0 the singular perturbation arguments are used to obtain the the approximate lower order actuator failure model in the form:
θi+δ , whereū 1i is the value at which the actuator has frozen. It is seen that, in the case of lock-in-place, the reduced-order model captures the fact that u 1i (t) =ū 1i for t ≥ t F i , since θ i (t) = 0 for t ≥ t F i .
Next, we consider the following assertion:
Based on the result of the assertion, the reduced-order dynamics of the plant with the actuators is of the form:
Adaptive Reconfigurable Controller: Let
The adaptive reconfigurable controller is now chosen in the form:
A question that now arises is whether the above controller, achieves the control objective. This is discussed below.
Theorem III.2:
The closed-loop system (1)- (4), (21) , where the adaptive parameters are adjusted using (16) , (17) , is stable and, even in the presence of total or partial LOE failures, lim t→∞ [x(t) − x * (t)] = 0. Proof: It is first recalled that, using the results of Theorem III.1,
for all i = 1, 2, ..., m. The main objective is to show that the tracking error e c = x − x * is bounded. The expressions (20) are first rewritten as:ẋ
where the term δu 1i φ
The controller equation (21) is substituted next, and the expressions (5), (6) are used to obtain:
The expression (14) for the ith actuator is next rewritten as:
Since 0 I A m is asymptotically stable and eachê i is shown to satisfyê i ∈ L 2 ∩ L ∞ , and since, according to Assumption 1(c), g(x) is bounded for all x, using the BIBO stability arguments it follows that e c ∈ L 2 ∩ L ∞ . Since x * is bounded, it follows that x is bounded as well. Boundedness of x implies boundedness of u, which in turn implies boundedness of each ω i . Hence eachė i ∈ L ∞ , which now, from the Barbalat's lemma, 19 implies that lim t→∞êi (t) = 0. From (23) it can now be concluded that lim t→∞ e c (t) = 0.
IV. Integrated HM-FLARE System
In the previous section a fault-tolerant control system was developed for the case of second-order actuator dynamics and non-measurable actuator rates, and the FDI observer design is based on the new failure parameterization that uses a single parameter θ to model a large class of actuator failures.
In this section the focus is on the case when the separately designed Health Monitoring system provides the failure information to the reconfigurable controller. Since there may be false failure information (i.e. false alarms or missed detections), a strategy that uses the HM information directly in the reconfigurable control law is not feasible since it can cause closed-loop instability. For this reason, the approch proposed here is based on combining the HM information with that generated by FLARE.
One of the main questions that arose at the outset of this research is how should the HM information be combined with that generated by FLARE to assure robustness of the system, and achieve the desired performance despite severe failures. There are numerous possibilities for combining the failure information, including: (i) Simple voting; (ii) Interacting Multiple Kalman Filters (IMKF); (iii) Information fusion using Bayes rules.
In the case of simple voting, a model is run in parallel to the actuator and the outputs are compared. If the output errors differ by more than a threshold, the actuator is declared failed. IMKF (ii) is based on assuming two models covering the no-failure and failure cases. These models are run in parallel, and posterior probabilities are calculated at every instant to arrive at a mixed parameter estimate. Bayes rule (iii) is based on the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve which represents a plot of probability of false alarm P F A against probability of detection P D as a function of decision-making system parameters.
Preliminary study of the above approaches has shown that they work in some cases, and do not work in other ones. The main problem is that we cannot prove either stability or robustness in these cases. For this reason, the focus is on a technique for which we can not only prove the robustness of the system, but also calculate the worst performance bound. This is discussed in the following sections.
IV.A. Information fusion using a modified adaptive law
The main idea behind the proposed approach is to use the HM information in the adaptive law for adjustingθ i so that the resulting closed-loop system is robust (i.e. all signals are bounded even in the case of persistent false failure information), and both tracking error and parametric errors converge to zero when the HM system eventually generates the right failure information. Unlike the other approaches proposed in the literature, in this case the time interval over which the HM system generates false failure information need not be known.
It should be emphasized that the main assumption here is that the HM system generates its own estimates of θ i , i.e. the HM generated failure information is expressed in terms of values of θ i .
Letθ HMi denote the estimate of θ i generated by the Health Monitoring (HM) system. The main idea in this paper is to modify the adaptive law for adjustingθ i as follows:
where γ oi > 0 and γ oi << 1. The reasoning behind such a modification is as follows: whenθ HMi (t) = θ i , the system will still be robust, while in the case whenθ HMi = θ i , ifê i (t) tends to zero,θ i (t) will tend to θ i . It will be shown next that the proposed modification indeed has such properties, and assures the robustness and stability of the system. It also indirectly improves the system performance since, onceθ i has converged to θ i , the system has the information about the true value of θ i resulting in improved robustness.
Theorem IV.1:
Modified adaptive law (24) results in boundedness of all signals in the system. Proof: The tentative Lyapunov function is chosen in the same form as in the previous case:
In this case its first derivative yields:V
Note that sinceV has an extra term, two cases are studied: (i)θ HMi = θ i , and (ii)θ HMi = θ i . Case 1:θ HMi = θ i . Letθ HMi =θ i , whereθ i = θ i . Then, recalling the definition of φ i =θ i − θ i and using the fact thatθ i ≤ 1 (due to the use of adaptive algorithms with projection), θ i ≤ 1, andθ i ≤ 1, one obtains:
It follows that V can increase only in a set where |ê i | ≤ γoi λ2i . Since this set contains the pointê i = 0, it follows that e i is bounded. Boundedness of all other signals in the system follows along the same lines as in the proof of Theorem III.1. Case 2:θ HMi = θ i . In this case, the adaptive law reduces to:
and the derivative of V is of the form:V
HenceV is strictly less than zero, and it immediately follows that bothê i and φ i tend to zero exponentially. Hence, if the HM system eventually generates the right failure information, it can be readily shown that both the tracking and parametric errors tend to zero exponentially.
IV.B. Worst-case performance bound calculation
One of the questions that arise here is that of the worst performance bound in the case when the HM system generates wrong failure information for all time. To study this case it is noted that the derivative of V in the worst case reduces to the form (25), i.e.V ≤ −λ 2iê
It is next noted that:
since |φ i (t)| ≤ 1 for all time due to the use of the adaptive algorithms with projection, and
Hence:V ≤ −2λ 2i V + c i ,
Since V is positive definite, one can integrate the above inequality to obtain:
, it follows that:
Sinceê i =û 1i − u 1i and u i1 is measurable, one can setû 1i (0) = u 1i (0). Hence:
It is seen that the worst-case performance bound is inversely proportional to γ i and λ 2i , and is directly proportional to γ oi . Since it is already assumed that λ 2i >> 1, large values of γ i and small values of γ oi are needed to guarantee that the estimation error will be small even in the case when the HMS generates false failure information for all time. However, small values of γ oi will result in slow convergence ofθ i (t) to θ i when the HMS generates the correct failure information. For this reason the values of γ oi should be chosen as a trade-off between these two conflicting requirements.
IV.C. Simulations
The proposed approach was implemented in Matlab and tested on a medium-fidelity simulation of an F/A-18. The simulation consists of linear stability and control derivatives, nonlinear kinematics, second-order flight control actuator dynamics, and position and rate limits on the control effectors.
The states of the model are: Total velocity V , pitch rate q, pitch angle θ, angle-of-attack α, altitude h, side-slip angle β, roll rate p, yaw rate r, roll angle φ, and yaw angle ψ. Figures 3 through 6 show the resulting aircraft states, actuator response and failure parameter estimates for various failure scenarios during a 30 degree lateral doublet. In each scenario, all left surfaces experience some loss of effectiveness and all right surfaces lock in place at 4 seconds into the maneuver. Also, since recovery from failure can be as severe as the failure itself, each scenario includes the recovery of the right trailing-edge flap (TEF) and aileron (AIL) at t = 12 seconds.
The following cases are considered: Case 1 -The HMS provides noisy failure parameter estimates for all t > 0. Case 2 -The HMS provides noisy failure parameter estimates for all t < 25 seconds. Case 3 -Missed detection: HMS does not acknowledge actual aircraft failures. Case 4 -False alarm: HMS detects non-existent aircraft failures.
Case 1 combines noisy, inaccurate failure information from the HMS with the FLARE system to generate failureparameter estimates that are used in the feedback loop for aircraft reconfiguration. As shown in Figures 3(a) through 3(d) , the states of the aircraft remain stable, the actuators do not saturate, and the parameter estimates attempt to capture the true failure characteristics despite false failure information.
Case 2 differs from Case 1 in two ways; First, the noisy and innacurate HMS information is not used in reconfiguration until t = 20 seconds. This would allow the HMS time to converge to some estimate of the failure characteristics. Second, the HMS actually learns the true failure parameters (at t = 25 seconds) and passes these on to the FLARE system for use in the ARC.
Case 3 simulates a missed detection on the part of the HMS. As can be seen in Figure 5(d) , the FLARE system quickly generates an estimate of each failure parameter. However, these estimates are pulled toward the false HMS estimates as the simulation progresses.
Case 4 studies the effect of false alarms in the HMS on the aircraft and IHM-FLARE system. As expected, the system remains stable and the maneuver is performed with little deviation from the reference model. Also, all failure parameter estimates are influenced by this false alarm from the HMS, however the leading-edge flaps and rudders are most affected.
It can be concluded that the proposed technique for integration of the HMS and FLARE information has the following properties: (i) It results in a system that is highly robust to the false failure information, and (ii) It assures the convergence of the failure parameter estimates to their true values once the HMS generates the right failure information. One of the main features of the proposed technique is that it achieves consistent performance as the performance in the case of missed failure detections is almost identical to that obtained in the case of false alarms. This is an important feature of the system from the point of view of potential practical implementations.
V. Conclusions
In this paper we describe the design of an Integrated Health Monitoring and Fast on-Line Actuator Reconfiguration Enhancement (IHM-FLARE) system whose role is to combine the failure parameter estimates from the two systems while assuring robustness to false failure alarms, missed detections, and failure detection delays. The main feature of the IHM-FLARE is that, besides assuring robustness, it can also improve the performance of the closed-loop system as more accurate failure information becomes available. The integration of the failure parameter estimates generated by both systems is carried out, and the worst-case performance bound is calculated for the case when the Health Monitoring system generates false failure information (i.e. either missed detections or false alarms) for all time. Properties of the proposed system are evaluated through simulations of high-performance aircraft under multiple simultaneous flight-critical failures.
Future work in this area includes extensive testing of the proposed technique through high-fidelity piloted simulations and flight tests on F/A-18 aircraft, as well as testing on other civilian and military aircraft. 
